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Abstract: 
As the modernisation of agribusiness became a more important driver of development for many 
Southeast Asian states, the region’s environment has become severely degraded. This paper 
argues that throughout the developmental history of Southeast Asia, the role of patronage politics 
has been a key factor behind environmental degradation. It presents historical evidence of 
circumstances preceding and surrounding early appearances of patronage networks in the region, 
particularly within the natural resource sector. Upon decolonization, the attitudes of the decision-
making elite of the region shaped development to focus on elite-centred natural resource 
exploitation. With government structures, processes and policies often favouring the interests of 
big businesses, environmental exploitation has remained the major drivers of growth in the 
region. First, this paper provides a general overview of developmental trends in the region to 
show how political realities encouraged patronage politics, and then focuses on Indonesia as a 
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select case study. This paper is part one of a two-part series by the same author, the second part 
of which will focus on Malaysia and Singapore and will be published in a subsequent volume of 
this journal. 
 
PATRONAGE POLITICS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: A HISTORICAL CASE 
STUDY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INDONESIA 
 
1. Introduction 
Environmental degradation in Southeast Asia is a consequence of the region’s changing political 
economy and modes of production. As the modernisation of agribusiness became a more 
important source of revenue and driver of development for many Southeast Asian states 
(McDowell 1989), the region has become depleted, dirtier, less ecologically diverse, and more 
environmentally vulnerable. Deforestation, land degradation, and the loss of arable land are the 
most visible evidence of the rate of environmental change in the region (Sumiani, Haslinda, and 
Lehman 2007). This accelerated environmental degradation through natural resource exploitation 
throughout the region is a major cause of loss of biodiversity in Southeast Asia, one of the most 
biologically diverse regions in the world (ASEAN Secretariat 2009).  
 
This paper argues that throughout the developmental history of Southeast Asia, the role of 
domestic patronage politics appears to be a key factor behind forest degradation in the region. To 
understand the context within which conditions for patronage politics, especially in the forestry 
and natural resource sector developed in the region, it is important to explore the origins of the 
attitudes of the decision-making elite, and the states’ structures and processes. Therefore, this 
paper presents historical evidence concerning the circumstances preceding and surrounding early 
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appearances of patronage networks in Southeast Asian society, particularly within the natural 
resource sector (Lande 1983). It offers a historical overview of how, upon decolonization, the 
attitudes of the decision-making elite of the region shaped development in the region to focus on 
elite-centred natural resource exploitation. 
 
Natural resources are materials or substances like petroleum, minerals, forests, water, and fertile 
land that occur in nature that can be used for economic gain (Chichilnisky 1996). This paper 
argues that by taking pointers from their colonial masters, Southeast Asian states have 
considered natural resources to be an invaluable engine for development, ready to be exploited. 
This Western understanding of development was inherited from their colonial experience upon 
independence (Dauvergne 1994) and paved the way for the use of natural resources by Southeast 
Asian leaders to achieve developmental and political goals. The functional importance of 
patronage politics were visible especially upon independence, as agribusiness companies headed 
by well-connected businesspeople became important players in these developmental and political 
agendas, as will be explained below. With government structures, processes and policies often 
favouring the interests of big businesses, environmental exploitation has remained the major 
drivers of growth in the region, remaining constant in the face of manufacturing and 
industrialization booms (Naguib and Smucker 2009). First, this paper provides a general 
overview of developmental trends in the region to show how political realities encouraged 
patronage politics in the pursuit of development, and then focuses on Indonesia as a select case 
study as a country from this region to further illustrate this argument.  
 
2. The Southeast Asian ‘development model’ 
4 
 
 
The Southeast Asian states today are rich in natural resources and are major world producers of 
rubber, tin, copra, palm oil, petroleum and timber (Chia 1999). Large-scale exploitation of the 
environment and natural resources in the region has its roots in colonialism. The attitudes of 
Southeast Asian decision makers toward ‘development’ are an important factor behind natural 
resource exploitation. These attitudes are rooted in colonial experience and based on a Western 
understanding of development. It is based on a set of attitudes and values that is chiefly 
concerned with shaping the world of nature through science and technology to make life more 
prosperous. The West defined environmental values primarily in relation to demands for steady 
economic growth. Inheriting these attitudes after independence, many Southeast Asian 
governments viewed forests as a valuable, yet expendable resource, useful for generating foreign 
exchange to finance other developmental goals like industrialization (Dauvergne 1994).  
 
Pre-colonial Southeast Asia was based largely on subsistence agriculture (Pasong and Lebel 
2000). It was a predominantly forest-covered region which supported a great number of hunter-
gatherer and shifting cultivating cultures alongside intensive wet-rice agrarian kingdoms and 
coastal trading states (Hirsch and Warren 1998). Coastal societies developed a maritime trade in 
goods such as silk, salt, cloves, and spices, while small-scale and generally sustainable 
agriculture was the mainstay of the economies of agrarian kingdoms (Pasong and Lebel 2000). 
During the pre-colonial times, the concept of land ownership as a sign of wealth was limited in 
Southeast Asia. Land was considered a gift from God or from the divine creator. Both 
individuals and the community as a whole had rights of use but the land itself could not be 
‘owned’ (Hurst 1987).  
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This social structure changed with the advent of colonial conquests in the region (Pasong and 
Lebel 2000). The colonial administrations, whether American, British or Dutch, regarded the 
forests as an ‘unproductive’ liability; but the land they stood on was seen as having great 
economic potential. Consequently all forest land was placed under state ‘ownership’ (Hurst 
1987). Southeast Asia became a natural resource and plantation crop ‘mine’ for the European 
economies (Hirsch and Warren 1998). Cash crops such as sugar, rubber and bananas became the 
economic backbone of many of these colonies. These crops were all grown on cleared forest 
land, and control over large areas of land became a source of considerable wealth (Hurst 1987). 
Foreign trade and commercial interests like the British East India Company and the Dutch 
Vereenigo Ost-Indische Company cooperated with the colonial state and were close allies of 
these administrations. Under colonial rule, the introduction of forestry and agriculture 
departments, and the adoption of new technologies for harvesting formed the start of the 
systematic exploitation of forest resources and land, primarily for the benefit of these colonial 
companies and the local elites that had cultivated patronage type links with them (Pasong and 
Lebel 2000). In this way, from the early 17
th
 century, Southeast Asian colonial land and labour 
was incorporated into the world markets (Sutton 2001).  
 
The process of decolonialization after World War II was based on colonial territorial boundaries 
and initiated the process of nation-building in most Southeast Asian societies (Pasong and Lebel 
2000). Newly independent states in the region faced the need to develop fast to cope with the 
increasing population demanding more food, clothing, shelter, jobs and education (Anonymous 
1980). In most Southeast Asian countries, the colonial system of land ownership remained in 
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force after independence (Hurst 1987). Newly independent Southeast Asian states used the 
plantations and agricultural knowledge also inherited from their colonial masters in their pursuit 
of nation-building and economic development (Gellert 2005). In effect, throughout the region, 
the colonial powers were replaced with a new land-owning elite, nearly all of whom were 
educated in western-orientated schools and who share the same concepts of ‘development’ as 
their teachers. One of the core tenets of this development model was industrialization. However, 
industrialization costs money and the only way for these Southeast Asian countries to obtain 
capital was (and still is) to sell their natural resources on the world markets (Hurst 1987).  
 
States which have long been exploited and suppressed by centuries of colonial rule, as was the 
case in most of Southeast Asia, often have a strong motivation to adopt this type of natural 
resource exploitation model for development (Ngai 1998). In the second half of the 1960s, 
countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines formally recognized 
(through policy, which is explained below) the agricultural sector’s role as an engine for overall 
economic growth. More importantly, these countries recognized that policies towards agriculture 
should move beyond micro level and sector-specific concerns and took steps to ensure that the 
overall macro policy environment was conducive to the growth of the agricultural sector (Than 
1998). Perception of development held by the central governments thus were translated into 
national programmes made applicable nationwide (Dauvergne 1994). 
 
As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, the major growth sectors in the region were grains, 
plantation crops, fisheries and forestry (timber). This trend has continued, and annual agricultural 
output of the region increased an average of 3.8% yearly since then (Roberti 1989). Governments 
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in the region thus continued to encourage expansion of this sector. As output increased in the 
1980s and 1990s, Southeast Asia’s resource wealth and relatively cheap labour sustained 
production enclaves for the export of primary agricultural, timber and mineral products (Jomo 
2003), and economic strategies in the region converged around export-oriented resource 
exploitation (Hirsch and Warren 1998).  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, a rapid expansion of the timber industry throughout the region was 
promoted by major development agencies such as the World Bank (Hurst 1987). Timber was a 
ready resource in the region to be cheaply cut down and exported to parts of Northeast Asia and 
Europe. Indonesia and Malaysia were particularly important global players in timber up till the 
1990s, which will be discussed in detail in the following section and also in the second part of 
this series of articles.  
 
Alongside the timber boom, agribusiness was hailed as the region’s ‘next economic miracle’ 
(Roberti 1989). The term ‘agribusiness’ came into popular use since the mid-1950s and implies 
the shift from ‘farming as a way of life’ to ‘farming as a business’ (Sutton 2001). Most recently 
it reflected the major increase in corporate investment in agriculture. Increasingly the term has 
come to describe an integrated farming system which links farm operations with both upstream 
and downstream manufacturing and distribution. The plantation approach within agribusiness is 
defined as the large scale production of tropical crops by a uniform system of cultivation under 
central management (Sutton 2001). This could be through working the land directly or by setting 
up a contract farming system between the core plantation management and surrounding land-
owning locals for added efficiency. Consequently, an increasing amount of logged land was 
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converted into plantation and cropland for agribusiness. Countries in Southeast Asia has since 
emerged as important producers and suppliers in the international market for agro-food (Sutton 
2001). 
 
a. The politicization of natural resources 
 
In most Southeast Asian countries, independence led to (arguably democratic) elections. Two 
developments transpired from this: politicians in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia faced 
increased pressure to continue on with the upward trajectory of development as justification for 
their continued rule, and these politicians needed additional funds to support political campaigns 
(Hirsch and Warren 1998). This led to the politicization of natural resource sectors, as land and 
resources of once peripheral zones in the region became hotly contested political and economic 
territory (Hirsch and Warren 1998) and instrumental tools with which to gain political support. 
This opened up avenues for collusion between elites in government and dominant conglomerates 
(Baswir 2003). For example, in the timber industry across the region,  politicians sought access 
to state power and office-based property (Scott 1972) in order to gain ‘allocation rights’ to rents, 
which were then distributed to selected businesspeople in exchange for political support and 
funding, or to friends, families, relatives and themselves, for personal or familial enrichment 
(Lim and Stern 2003). In return, these ‘client’ businesses funded political campaigns and other 
development initiatives (Lim and Stern 2003) to help their patrons gain political support.  
 
These patronage networks helped build close links between politicians and businesses (Singh and 
Zammit 2006) resulting in a web of reciprocal relationships upon which they were 
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interdependent (Lim and Stern 2003; Pasong and Lebel 2000). This reciprocal relationship 
spurred the development of policies that favour powerful economic and political interests 
(Dauvergne 1994) and the development of governance systems that lacked institutional capacity 
and political willingness to enforce their own environmental regulations (Pasong and Lebel 
2000). In this way, growing economic opportunities were exploited by a powerful few (Johnston 
2005). However, in the absence of modern legal and market institutions, the highly personalistic 
nature of this system is said to have been essential to the credible enforcement of (often 
unwritten) contracts which have led to high economic growth in Southeast Asia (Lim and Stern 
2003). 
 
In this way, resource-rich states like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand harnessed the resources 
and ingenuity of the private sector to drive the development of its agribusiness sectors. Private 
companies across the region used research and development, modern marketing techniques, and 
modern distribution systems to make logging and farming more profitable (Roberti 1989). While 
much of the wealth generated from this sector was captured by restricted groups linked to those 
with political power, in return, these groups contributed to national growth by reinvesting in 
areas like import substituting industries, commerce, services, as well as privatized utilities and 
infrastructure (Jomo 2003). This was expected to attract new investment, boost exports, reduce 
unemployment, and create new prosperity outside the major urban centers (Roberti 1989). Under 
this structure, the access to resources and the continuity of exploitation and commodification of 
the environment was seen as fundamental for development (Gellert 2005).  
 
b. Development at the cost of the environment 
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Such a development model based around natural resource exploitation often leads to an 
unbalanced development strategy which sacrifices the environment purely for the sake of 
economic gains at all costs. As a result, states often relegate the environment low on their lists of 
priorities (Koh and Wilcove 2007). Specific policies favouring natural resource exploitation by 
large-scale conglomerates such as low stumpage fees and log export taxes, and agro-conversion 
policies also encouraged unsustainable exploitation of timber and land (Dauvergne 1994). For 
example, due to the under-pricing of timber licenses in countries like Indonesia and the 
Philippines, timber tended to be overexploited (Iwami 2001). Tools used for environmental 
planning such as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process also often becomes 
compromised by political interests as well as by corruption and mismanagement (Tan 2004), and 
are rarely implemented effectively (Briffett 1999).  
 
Because of the region’s focus on exploitation for development, and encouraged by its  successes 
in raising agricultural productivity, Southeast Asia as a whole seemed to be facing a problem of 
preserving the natural environment (Gellert 2005; Iwami 2001). Against this background of rapid 
economic development, Southeast Asian states’ finite resources (especially its forests) and 
fragile ecosystems are being threatened (Ngai 1998). Environmental degradation accelerated as 
production for domestic and foreign markets drove rapid opening of forestland for cash crops, 
mining, and timber (Gellert 2005; Iwami 2001; Pasong and Lebel 2000; Sumiani, Haslinda, and 
Lehman 2007). Exports of timber and plantation crops from places like Borneo and Sumatera 
have severely reduced tropical rainforests in the region. In fact, the speed of deforestation is 
higher in Southeast Asia than in the Amazonian areas in Latin America (Iwami 2001; Sumiani, 
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Haslinda, and Lehman 2007). The environmental consequences of such a path of exploitation are 
found in widespread deforestation, pollution of waterways, conversion and degradation of 
agricultural land, poor air quality, and declining populations of fish and wildlife (Raman 2006). 
This has led to the frequent occurrence of environmental disasters, like severe flooding and 
transboundary haze, as this region ‘pays the price’ for rushing its growth (Ngai 1998). 
 
When environmental aspects were considered at all, they were understood as unavoidable 
‘externalities’ of growth or short term costs of ‘development’ that could and should only be 
addressed later (Chang and Rajan 2001; Gellert 2005). This so-called ‘developmentalist’ school 
of thought argue that large scale development schemes such as dams, plantations or roads may 
create immediate short-term damage to the forests but the long-term economic benefits will 
eventually protect the forests (Dauvergne 1994). This has been called the ‘pollute first, clean up 
later’ approach (Karim 2008) along the lines of an environmental Kuznets curve, where it was 
understood that once sufficient levels of development was achieved, environmental issues should 
resolve themselves (Chang and Rajan 2001). It was widely accepted that the uses and abuses of 
the environment by these elite entrepreneurs were vital to the production of the developmental 
‘miracle’ (Chang and Rajan 2001). This encouraged the development of patronage networks that 
supported the operations of these elite entrepreneurs. Many states in the region saw development 
as the solution to environmental problems; with economic progress comes the capacity to better 
manage the environment (McDowell 1989). Therefore, there was a presumption among regional 
governments that environmental concerns were something that should wait until income levels 
are much closer to those in developed countries, and that these improvements would come 
naturally (Chang and Rajan 2001).  
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Political systems containing patronage networks often also use ideological deception to justify 
action that is in the interests of political and economic elites (Gunes-Ayata 1994). Indeed 
environmental exploitation by selected elites was justified at the local and international level by 
political and economic leaders of Southeast Asia as the ‘price of growth’ (Gellert 2005; Karim 
2008), often linking these issues with national resilience against developed country ‘eco-
imperialists
1’ (Elliott 2003; Karim 2008). Malaysia was particularly instrumental in defining the 
anti eco-imperialist discourse (as will be discussed in part two of this series), and Indonesia fully 
embraced the argument for economic and political benefit (Elliott 2003; Karim 2008). The 
following sections go into the details of the development trajectory of Indonesia to show how its 
political system encouraged and supported patronage politics in the pursuit of development.  
 
3. Natural resources and development in Indonesia 
 
Like most states in Southeast Asia, Indonesia also relegates environmental protection to a fairly 
low point on its list of public priorities (Business Asia 1995). Indonesia’s forest cover was an 
estimated 133 million hectares, or around two-thirds of its land area, and Indonesia had some of 
the most extensive concentrations of tropical hardwoods in the world. However, these forests 
have now been over-logged by over 30 years of no-holds barred exploitation during Indonesia’s 
long economic boom (Barber 1998), and illegal logging is responsible for more than 50% of this 
deforestation (Business Monitor International Ltd 1998). A World Resources institute analysis 
concluded that Indonesia had only some 53 million hectares left of ‘frontier forest’; relatively 
undisturbed areas of forest big enough to maintain all of its biodiversity (Fatah and Udiansyah 
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2009). Indonesia is losing approximately 2 million hectares of forest every year (Fatah and 
Udiansyah 2009), and logged-over land is often converted to plantations. Currently Indonesia’s 
is a major producer of estate crops like oil palm, rubber, cocoa, coconut, coffee and tea (Schwarz 
1990). Indonesia is now one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the world as a result of 
this land-use change (Hunt 2010).  
 
The basic Indonesian attitudes towards forest use and assumptions of the Indonesian forest 
policy stem from Dutch colonial practice in the 19
th
 century. Concerned only with the teak 
forests of Java, the Dutch developed a system of forestry based on state ownership and control 
over forestlands. Although cloaked in conservation rhetoric, the colonial state’s basic objective 
was to profit by cultivating teak plantations. Upon independence, the new government inherited 
this system. The 1945 constitution attempted to bind the country together by stating that all of 
Indonesia’s land, water, and natural resources would be under the direct control of the state 
(Barber 1998). 
 
During the mid 1960s, Indonesia was among the poorest nations in the world, with a per capita 
income just USD 50. Development became the focus and justification of President Suharto’s 
regime ever since he came to power in 1967. Systematic exploitation of natural resources 
provided the basic capital for the development process (Barber 1998). In what was called ‘one of 
the largest land grabs in history’ the Suharto government appropriated 90% of all forest land, 
thereby almost completely centralizing government control over forest resources, negating 
Native Customary Land claims (Duncan 2007; Palmer and Engel 2007). In the late 1960s, the 
Suharto government, at the suggestion of the World Bank, encouraged rapid exploitation of land 
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and forests to finance the increasing foreign debt (especially to Japan, which is a major timber 
importer) and general development. International Monetary Fund policies further encouraged the 
import of manufactured goods and northern technology in exchange for natural resources, 
especially timber (Dauvergne 1994).  
 
Without vast reserves of oil, timber, minerals and other resources, the Indonesian economic story 
would be very different. Suharto utilized the exploitation of these natural resources to jump start 
and sustain a process of economic development that the World Bank praised in 1994 as ‘one of 
the best in the developing world’ (Barber 1998). The export of natural resources played a central 
role in economic growth, as oil, tin, timber and plantation crops quickly became the largest 
source of foreign currency for Indonesia (Nomura 2009). The timber industry alone provided 
wood products for export worth USD5.5 billion per year, which was 15% of the country’s local 
exports (Jati 1994). Indeed, with this natural resource and agricultural focus, the Indonesian 
economy experienced an average annual growth of 6.5% from 1967. There was a fall of -13.6% 
in GDP in 1998 during the AFC, but agricultural growth remained fairly constant during this 
time, and only finance, construction, and manufacturing experienced serious contractions in 1998 
(Brown 2006).  
 
Heightened demand for forest resources in Indonesia arose from four main sources: the timber 
industry’s continuous demand for wood, the growing pulp and paper industry, the surging 
demand for land on which to establish oil palm and other estate crops, and  plans to increase the 
mining of coal, vast deposits of which lie under the forests of Kalimantan and Sumatra (Barber 
1998). By the 1990s, the economic value of Indonesia’s production forests and land was 
15 
 
estimated at between USD 1,283 and USD 1,416 per hectare per year (Prasetyo, Suwarno, 
Purwanto, and Hakim 2009). Therefore, Indonesia pinned great hopes on agribusiness to help 
solve a number of its more important developmental problems (Barber 1998). Agriculture was 
the largest sector of the Indonesian economy in terms of output until it was overtaken by 
manufacturing in 1991. It however remained the most important sector in terms of employment, 
providing jobs for more than 50% of the workforce. Outside Java, where most industry is 
concentrated, two-thirds of the population still work the land (Business Monitor International Ltd 
1998; Than 1998). The Indonesian government foresaw that by developing commercial cash 
crops in the provinces, there would be a lifting of rural incomes which in turn should reduce the 
incidence of poverty and labour migration to the cities (Schwarz 1990).  
 
The regime’s attitudes towards development at the expense of natural resources could be seen 
from how the Indonesian government started environmental efforts. Emil Salim, the first 
Indonesian Minister of the Environment in 1978, was appointed to the post under the Suharto 
government as he was considered to be capable of implementing environmental policies without 
hindering economic growth, and for his ability to attach environmental issues to other political 
issues, such as global eco-imperialist and environmental justice arguments (Nomura 2009). Emil 
Salim criticized developing countries, arguing that instead of complaining, they should pay the 
cost of maintenance of the Indonesian environment (eg. its forests) because they were the main 
consumer of Indonesian natural resources (Nomura 2009). Other ministers echoed this sentiment 
even in the face of environmental disasters. When asked to comment on the 1983 East 
Kalimantan fires that choked the region with smoke, the Forestry Minister at the time argued that 
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“much of the area that was burned was conversion forest. So what you have is land clearing for 
free. The forest fire was the natural way of clearing the land” (Dauvergne 1994). 
 
c. Patronage politics within the ‘Suharto circle’ (1967-1998) 
 
Since the late 1960s, Indonesian forestlands was very important to Suharto: forests were a 
substantial source of state revenue, a resource for political patronage, a safety valve for scarcities 
of land and resources in the densely populated Java, and a vehicle to spread his ideological, 
political, security, and economic objectives into the hinterland (Barber 1998). Early on, Suharto 
realized the effectiveness of the private-sector monopoly privileges for generating rents (Lim and 
Stern 2003). Suharto used concessions and other resource exploitation rights to reward political 
clients, and co-opt hostile or potentially hostile opponents, and fund (and ensure the loyalty of) 
both the civilian bureaucracy and the military (Barber 1998).  
 
Most significantly, Suharto entered into public-private partnerships with politically weak but 
economically important members of the Chinese ethnic minority (cukong) (Brown 2006). 
Suharto was convinced that only the Chinese could deliver modernization (Brown 2006). 
Suharto’s practices were expressed through a poplar refrain, ‘korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme’ 
(corruption, collusion, and nepotism, known by the local acronym KKN) (Case 2003). As Cotton 
(1999) previously argued, the specific use of bureaucratic instruments by Suharto (examples 
below) compromised and undermined the rational-legal capacity of the state to deal KKN issues. 
Indonesian politics during the Suharto era was thus described as ‘a bureaucratic polity based on 
patronage ties’ (Cheung 2004). Suharto distributed largesse across elite factions in the state 
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bureaucracy, military and conglomerates, thus populating the landscape with bureaucratic 
families, financial generals, and his own business-minded offspring (Case 2003).  
 
From 1970 onwards, Suharto cheaply granted large-scale permits known as HPH (Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan, a large scale timber extraction concession license) to these cukongs (Barber 
1998). With the advent of the timber boom in the 1970s, nearly one-third of the nation’s territory 
passed into the hands of these concession holders (Barber 1998). Suharto also offered these 
cukongs tariff protections, preferential access to monopoly licenses and contracts, subsidized 
credits and other benefits. Therefore, the elite circle in the USD 6 billion timber industry enjoyed 
cheap access to forest resources and virtual immunity from forestry regulations for decades 
(Brown 2006; Dunning 2005; Gellert 2005; Lim and Stern 2003). The undercharging of these 
concession privileges and royalties encouraged over-exploitation; the obvious result of cheap 
access (Ascher 1998). Extraction was almost out of control: too many well connected and 
powerful people had a strong vested interest in pressing forward (Pasong and Lebel 2000). 
 
As a result, this industry grew into an elitist (Barber 1998),  highly concentrated, wealthy, and 
well-connected political and economic sector dependent on cheap raw material, accustomed to 
high levels of profit, and able to pass the environmental costs of unsustainable logging practices 
on to local communities, the state, and society at large (Barber 1998). Networks of these Chinese 
entrepreneurs in turn provided Suharto with an important source of personal financing as well as 
an increased domestic tax base (Brown 2006; Dunning 2005; Lim and Stern 2003). Indeed, 
Suharto was known as ‘Mr. Ten Percent’ (Lee and Oh 2007). Additionally, the loggers applied 
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part of their profits to the development projects that the president has signaled as his priorities, 
like risky projects and bailouts (Ascher 1998).  
 
Significantly, the Sino-Indonesian elite businesspeople did not seem to pose a credible future 
threat to Suharto’s power, precisely because of their minority status (Brown 2006; Dunning 
2005; Lim and Stern 2003). The Pribumi (indigenous) elite could have been a threat to Suharto; 
they could have pursued an alliance with other contenders for political leadership. In cutting 
them out of most of the rent seeking opportunities in the oil and forestry sectors, Suharto 
neutralized this group that had the potential for independent political power (Ascher 1998). 
Therefore, Suharto’s government stressed exploitation for development as a necessary ingredient 
for loyalty, stability and national integration (Dauvergne 1995).  
 
Approximately 500 concessionaires, under the control of 50 conglomerates, held timber licenses 
to log more than 60 million hectares of production forests. About two-thirds of logging 
conglomerates were controlled by Sino-Indonesians (Dauvergne 1995). Virtually all the top 
players in the timber industry in Indonesia were Sino-Indonesians connected personally and 
financially with members of the president’s family (Barber 1998). However certain individuals 
were able to acquire land at a particularly furious rate (Duncan 2007). Most notable among them 
were Mohamad ‘Bob’ Hasan, Prajogo Pangetsu, Eka Tjipta Widjadja, and the prolific Liem Sioe 
Liong, first chairman of the massive Salim Group (Brown 2006).  
 
The Indonesian timber industry was controlled by Bob Hassan, a close friend of Suharto. He 
controlled the powerful Asosiasi Panel Kayu Indonesia (APKINDO or the Indonesian Wood 
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Panel Association), the Indonesian organization which monopolized the country’s trade in wood 
products, and was said to be almost single-handedly responsible for the rapidly vanishing 
Indonesian forests (Gellert 2005). It has been said that while the Forestry Department of 
Indonesia cooperated with APKINDO, APKINDO really made policy (Dauvergne 1994). 
Another timber tycoon, Prajogo Pangestu, who runs P.T. Barito Pacific Timber, came to control 
more of the world’s tropical rainforests than any other individual (Henley 2007). His 
conglomerate was also the largest borrower of state funds, with more than USD 1 billion in loans 
(Dauvergne 1995). 
 
Liem Sioe Liong (partnered with Eka Tjipta Widjadja) headed Indonesia’s largest Chinese 
owned conglomerate. In Indonesia, the Salim Group accounted for about 5% of GDP, and Liem 
was the undisputed king of Indonesian agricultural commodities, banking and cement (Schwarz 
1991). Liem’s prime skill was the ability to find first-rate partners and accommodate himself to 
prevailing political realities of the patronage system (Cheung 2004). In the 1950s, building on 
trade links forged with republican troops during Indonesia’s fight for independence, he became a 
supplier to the army’s prestigious Diponegoro division, headquartered in Central Java. The 
division’s commander was Major Suharto. After Suharto’s accession to presidency in 1966, 
Liem’s stock rose even further. The Salim Group had a significant stake in forestry products, 
with six plywood mills in Kalimantan and logging rights on about 200,000 hectares. Revenues 
from wood-based industries reached USD 200 million. Under government encouragement, the 
Salim Group also invested in agribusiness. It held the rights to 200,000 ha of palm oil estates and 
100,000 ha of sugar plantations under cultivation. It also held rubber estates, and plantations of 
tea, cocoa, fruit and vegetables (Schwarz 1991).  
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When Suharto and his economic planners needed financial support, these individuals were the 
first persons they turned to for help. For example, in 1990 to 1991, when Bank Duta, a bank 
owned by foundations connected to the president announced that it lost USD 430 million, at 
Suharto’s request, Prajogo Pangestu and Liem Sioe Liong’s timber companies came to the rescue 
with ready cash to compensate for the foreign exchange (Ascher 1998; Barber 1998). Pangestu 
has also been known to make substantial ‘donations’ to charities and social programs connected 
to Suharto’s family (Dauvergne 1995). Cronies also helped Suharto realize some of his national 
development goals, for example, by making investments in sectors which private enterprise 
would otherwise not invest; most notable here was the Salim Group’s investment in the Krakatua 
steel-making facility which subsequently went bankrupt (Lim and Stern 2003). But these 
cukongs expected to receive something in return. In exchange for undertaking huge infrastructure 
projects at times when the government was unable to do so, they demanded and received a range 
of trading privileges, exclusive production licenses, and cheap financing. Many competitors 
believe that this reciprocal relationship essentially meant that these individuals were above the 
law and immune from any enforcement measures (Schwarz 1991).  
 
Therefore, patronage politics during the Suharto era drove destructive logging and undermined 
state capacity to manage their forests (Dauvergne 1995), resulting in the depletion of timber 
stocks by the 1990s. This was visible through the adoption of policies that favour the logging and 
agribusiness industries that promoted exploitation (Dauvergne 1994). The most significant 
response was to increase the source of raw materials through permits to clear cut the forest via 
Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu (wood use permits). Furthermore, the state reforestation fund was 
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diverted to providing generous subsidies for fast-growing pulp and paper plantations (Dauvergne 
1995). And even though the Environment Ministry urged companies to carry out voluntary EIAs, 
a ministerial decision in 1994 ensured that audits were essentially the property of companies and 
can be kept secret (Business Asia 1995). In some cases, operating permits for development 
projects were issued even before EIAs have been prepared (Lucas 1998). Further, the launch of a 
scheme to rate the environmental performance of large companies have been delayed several 
times, supposedly because the government needed more time to ‘refine the criteria’ (Business 
Asia 1995).  
 
The state further blocked the flow of certain types of information, such as news on conflicts and 
forest degradation, from reaching the center and a wider international audience (Gellert 2005). 
Again in typical ‘tropical government’ fashion, the state also tried to shift international focus 
from logging concessionaires to farmers practicing shifting agriculture, claiming that they were 
in fact responsible for some 300,000 hectares of deforestation per annum (Barber 1998). In this 
way, the state was deeply implicated in the unsustainable logging of the remaining rainforests 
(Henley 2007). Programs sponsored or encouraged by the government was said to have 
accounted for two-thirds of all deforestation (Barber 1998). Realizing this, the World Bank, 
which had previously joined Indonesia in blaming shifting cultivators for deforestation, shifted 
blame to the government in 2001, observing that the smallholder category has been overrated as 
a cause for deforestation (Gellert 2005).  
 
Despite this, in the forestry sector of Indonesia, successful industrialization and export of 
plywood and promotion of tree plantations were promoted as developmental even if the benefits 
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accrued to a narrow band of politically well-connected firms (Gellert 2005). The role of the 
timber sector was supported by the discourse of national development, as seen in the Ministry of 
Forestry’s broad claims:  
 
The logging industry is a champion of sorts. It opens up inaccessible areas to 
development; it employs people; it evolves whole communities; it supports related 
industries … It creates the necessary conditions for social and economic development. 
Without forest concessions most of the Outer Islands would still be underdeveloped.  
(Gellert 2005) 
 
Because power was consolidate with Suharto, the president was able to ensure that investments 
were efficient, and thus patronage networks and corruption did not stunt growth in the forestry 
sector (Brown 2006). Indeed, despite the notorious ‘crony capitalism’, Suharto maintained his 
power for more than three decades, which some argue can be accounted for simply because of 
his success in maintaining economic development (Iwami 2001). Because of the highly 
centralized nature of the Indonesian state under Suharto, the ‘modern’ patronage networks that 
were nurtured in the forestry sector during this time were very streamlined, often involving direct 
links to Suharto himself. This is contrasted by Malaysia’s more complex networks across 
different levels of governance, due to its federal-state separation and the Ali-Baba subcontracting 
systems in place, which will be discussed in part two of this series.  
 
4. Conclusion 
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This article has done two important things. It has argued that the focus on the exploitation of 
natural resources in Southeast Asian countries has an inherently political dimension; that of the 
attitudes of the decision-making elite, which inherited ideas of development through the 
exploitation of natural resources from their colonial predecessors. Second, this paper has also 
argued that this has provided an environment ripe for the establishment of political structures and 
processes that support and encourage the development of ubiquitous patronage networks. As a 
whole, these circumstances encouraged and accelerated environmental degradation across the 
region where well-connected patrons and clients abuse the resource base for personalistic ends. 
In particular, through a close analysis of Indonesia’s developmental trajectory, this paper argues 
that patronage networks have complimented and encouraged the process of natural resource 
exploitation in Indonesia. A second article that will appear in a subsequent volume of this journal 
will continue this analysis in the context of Indonesia’s closest neighbours, Malaysia and 
Singapore, to further elucidate this argument. 
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1
 Eco-imperialism is the argument that, like the European imperialists of old, today’s eco-imperialists keep 
developing countries destitute so that the pristine ecosystems and forests of these developing countries can continue 
to benefit the developed world (Driessen, 2005). 
